Measuring Idiosyncratic Risk:Implications for Capital Flows by Sunesen, Eva Rytter
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
Measuring Idiosyncratic Risk
Sunesen, Eva Rytter
Publication date:
2006
Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (APA):
Sunesen, E. R. (2006). Measuring Idiosyncratic Risk: Implications for Capital Flows. Cph.: Department of
Economics, University of Copenhagen.
Download date: 02. Feb. 2020
DISCUSSION PAPERS 
Department of Economics 
University of Copenhagen 
 
 
 
 
06-20 
 
 
Measuring Idiosyncratic Risk:  
Implications for Capital Flows 
 
Eva Rytter Sunesen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Studiestræde 6, DK-1455 Copenhagen K., Denmark 
Tel. +45 35 32 30 82 - Fax +45 35 32 30 00 
http://www.econ.ku.dk 
 
 
Measuring Idiosyncratic Risk: Implications for Capital Flows
by Eva Rytter Sunesen
3 October 2006
Abstract
This paper o¤ers two renements of the traditional risk measure based on the volatility
of growth. First, we condition GDP growth on structural characteristics of the host
country that move only slowly and therefore can be partly predicted by an investor.
Second, we adjust conditional risk for the systematic components due to the global and
regional interdependence between alternative investment locations. The decomposition
of conditional risk into its systematic and idiosyncratic components reveals that not
only are African countries on average characterised by a larger conditional risk than
Asian and Latin American countries, but the idiosyncratic risk factor also represents a
larger share than in other developing countries. As a nal contribution, we search the
empirical literature on foreign direct investment and risk in order to determine which
of the suggested risk measures provide the best description of idiosyncratic risk. Using
a general-to-specic methodology, we nd that both economic and political risk factors
are important elements in the investment decision. We also nd that commercial risk
factors applied in the literature so far are poor determinants of idiosyncratic risk.
1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has become an important source of capital in developing countries
during the last decade with FDI inows more than tripling since the mid 1990s. However, Table
1 shows that the regional distribution of FDI has been heavily biased against the poor African
countries. Despite e¤orts to improve the investment climate, see for example UNCTAD (1999),
African countries only account for around 6% of the total FDI going to developing countries in
the period 2000-2003, whereas Asia & Pacic and Latin America & Caribbean have on average
attracted almost one third of FDI each. This means that in spite of absolute increases in FDI
inows throughout the period, Africa has experienced a drop in FDI inows relative to other
developing countries.
Table 1. FDI Inows to Developing Countries
1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2003
Developing countries 2,873 6,693 10,837 14,470 51,075 151,544 161,688
Asia & Pacic 15.2 15.8 23.1 37.0 52.4 39.2 34.8
Europe & Central Asia 2.0 1.0 0.8 2.3 9.0 14.6 20.3
Latin America & Caribbean 54.8 53.5 58.4 41.7 30.7 40.1 35.8
Africa1) 17.4 19.9 13.2 18.6 5.8 4.4 6.1
Note: Annual averages of net FDI inows (millions of dollars), 1970-2003.1) Numbers do not include South Africa.
Source: World Bank (2005).
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Figure 1 depicts the rates of return on FDI for the sample of US foreign investors surveyed by
UNCTAD (1999). The average return on US investment to Africa over the period 1983-97 was 23%.
This compares with 21% for Asia & Pacic and 12% for Latin America & Caribbean. The gure
indicates that, at least for the sample of investors included in the survey, the uneven distribution
of FDI across developing countries cannot be explained by a low return in African countries as
compared to other developing countries. This puzzle has also been reected in the way the focus
of the empirical FDI literature has changed over time.
Figure 1. Rates of Return on US FDI to Developing Countries (Per cent)
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Note: Rates of return have been calculated as the net income of US foreign a¢ liates in a given
year divided by the FDI stock. Numbers do not include South Africa.
Source: UNCTAD (1999).
While a large part of the empirical literature on FDI has focussed mainly on the traditional
low-return explanation of insu¢ cient FDI inows to certain developing countries, more recent stud-
ies have applied various risk measures to control for the country risk of investing abroad. The
importance of risk stems from the fact that, in the face of the uncertainty connected to foreign
investments, the objective of investors is to maximise the expected return of their investment. This
means that risk becomes a critical element in the investment decision. Since aggregate data on re-
turns to FDI is generally unavailable for a satisfactory number of countries for a su¢ cient number
of years, it is impossible to capture risk as the variance of such returns. Basically, empirical papers
on FDI and risk can be grouped according to the way they proxy for country risk.
First, a large part of the literature has included various economic, political and commercial
risk measures to account for the risk of investing in foreign countries. The extensive survey of the
literature linking FDI to risk provided in this paper concludes that while there seems to have been
reached a consensus on the importance of economic risk measures (and which proxies to include),
the inclusion of political and commercial risk measures has been more ad hoc and a large variety of
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proxies have been tested. The second brand of the literature has applied various volatility measures
to proxy for the risk of foreign investments. Suggested volatility measures have been based on
ination, exchange rates or terms of trade, but the most frequently used volatility measure is the
variance of GDP growth.This paper provides a bridge between these two empirical methodologies.
Taking the variance of GDP growth as the overall proxy for total risk, we argue that variance should
only be interpreted as risk when events are unpredictable, and that this risk measure therefore does
not reect truly idiosyncratic country risk. This paper suggests two renements that take out
the structural and systematic components of total risk thereby o¤ering an improved measure of
idiosyncratic country risk.
First, we derive a conditional risk measure by drawing on the Solow (1956) growth model to
account for the structural characteristics of the host country that move only slowly and therefore
can be partly predicted by an investor. Second, we account for the interdependencies of competing
investment locations. Figure 1 suggests that there is a global business cycle characterised by
a common trend in many of the time periods but also the presence of regional shocks that cause
regional returns to diverge in other periods. By using a principal components analysis (PCA) we are
able to adjust for the systematic risk components caused by global and regional interdependence.
In the end, this exercise allows us to decompose conditional risk into its global, regional and
idiosyncratic risk components. We argue that only the idiosyncratic portion of conditional risk is
country risk, while the rst principal component itself (systemic component of risk) is driven by
global factors and/or contagion. By symmetry, the rst principal component in a region-by-region
PCA is driven by regional factors. We then pose the question: "Could the undercapitalisation in
Africa be due to the presence of a relatively large country risk? Results show that not only are
African countries on average characterised by a higher conditional risk, but idiosyncratic risk also
constitutes a larger share of risk as compared with Asian and Latin American countries.
As a nal exercise we are interested in analysing how the rened risk measure correlates with
the proxies of risk suggested in the empirical FDI literature. We collect as many risk measures from
our survey articles as possible and utilise an econometric general-to-specic methodology to select
those indicators that best describe idiosyncratic risk. Overall, we conclude that both economic
and political risk variables are important determinants of idiosyncratic risk. This means that
studies that focus solely on one type of risk (typically economic risk) leave out important variables
resulting in biased and inconsistent results. Rather than including various risk measures on an ad
hoc basis, our results indicate that certain aspects of country risk are more dominant than others.
In particular, the ability of a country to service its debt, the current account balance, government
consumption, democratic accountability and external conicts are important determinants of risk.
Also, we nd that the proxies of commercial risk applied in the literature so far correlate poorly
with idiosyncratic risk and more attention should be directed towards nding better proxies for the
commercial aspects of idiosyncratic risk.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an extensive survey of empirical studies
of FDI and risk. While there seems to have been reached a consensus on which economic risk
measures to include, a large variety of political and commercial risk measures have been tested.
As an alternative, Section 3 derives a rened risk measure that conditions total risk on slowly
moving economic fundamentals of the host economy and takes the systematic risk components
due to global and regional integration into account. Using econometric tools, we are then able
to decompose total risk into its conditional, systematic and idiosyncratic components. Section
4 applies a general-to-specic framework to select those economic, political and commercial risk
measures that best describe idiosyncratic risk. Finally, Section 5 summarises and concludes.
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2 Empirical Risk Measures: A summary
Theoretical work has pointed out a number of di¤erent channels through which risk can inuence
investments under various assumptions about risk aversion, adjustment costs to investment, irre-
versibility of the investment decision, market competition and returns to scale.1 Some of these
e¤ects operate in contradictory directions, however, and hence the sign of the investment-risk rela-
tionship is indeterminate on a priori grounds.
Relative to the analytical literature, empirical studies of risk and investment have only started
to appear during the last decade or so. Due to the lack of a theoretical framework for studying FDI,
there is no guide to the selection of relevant risk measures. Most empirical studies have therefore
adopted a non-structural approach, in which various proxies are appended to otherwise conventional
investment determinants. A large selection of these papers have been summarised in Table A1-A3.
Following Nordal (2001) we divide country risk into economic, political and commercial risk.
Economic risk is risk related to the macroeconomic development of the host country that may
inuence the protability of an investment. Political risk is the uncertainty associated with changes
in government policy upon the cash ow accruing to rms and investors. Commercial risk is risk
related to the specic investment, such as the risk related to the fullment of contracts with private
companies and local partners.
Economic risk has long been recognised as being important for the attractiveness of a host
country. Changes in the real exchange rate contribute to risk in at least two ways. First, the
most notable di¤erence between FDI and other types of investment is the addition of transfer risk
to other potential risk factors. Transfer risk is the risk of potential restrictions on the ability to
remit funds across national borders. A depreciating real exchange rate means that the real value
of the foreign investment (measured in terms of the investors home country currency) will be
undermined.2 Changes in the (real or nominal) exchange rate have be used by Ancharaz (2002),
Deichmann (2001), Kamaly (2002) and Wezel (2003) as measures of exchange rate risk. Second,
the value of a countrys currency may be destabilised by excessive monetary policy or by economic
upheaval. Thus, ceteris paribus, a constant real exchange rate is preferred by foreign investors since
it is a sign of economic stability. Lemi and Asefa (2003) and Garibaldi et al. (2002) have therefore
included some measure of exchanges rate volatility (variance of the real exchange rate) while others
have included more direct indicators of exchange rate stability (dummy for a xed exchange rate,
a preannounced exchange rate regime or the existence of multiple exchange rates).
Another frequently applied measure of economic risk is ination (or the variance of ination as
seen in Lemi and Asefa, 2003). Since a high rate of ination often results from excessively expan-
sive monetary and scal policies a record of high and unpredictable ination creates uncertainty
regarding the net present value of a costly long-term investment, and potential direct investors may
perceive di¢ culty even in making short-term pricing decisions.
Overall, an economically stable economy will be relatively more attractive. Like exchange rate
risk, economic instability contributes to a higher transfer risk. This is so because a highly indebted
country (as measured by the external debt share, the debt-service ratio or the long-term debt
ratio) induces economic agents to anticipate future tax liabilities to service the debt and to expect
political turmoil. Another measure of economic stability, applied by Kamaly (2002) and Onyeiwu
1We refer to Servén (1998) for a summary of the theoretical literature on investment and risk.
2A depreciating exchange rate will also have a direct impact on return since it makes productive capacity cheaper
and investors can therefore export more easily. This e¤ect might, however, be outweighed by the costs investors
incur to prevent transaction and translation losses when currencies depreciate. In any case, this paper ignores the
impact exchange rate volatility has on return and focuses on the e¤ect running through risk.
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and Shrestha (2004), is the availability of international reserves since foreign investors regard large
international reserves as reecting a vital host economy. Finally, the government decit, the balance
of payments decit and the current account balance have been used as indicators of government
credibility since the presence of such imbalances may weaken the availability of external credit and
spur expectations of higher future tax liabilities.
The importance of political risk has been increasingly acknowledged since the late 1990s.
Within the set of political risk measures one can distinguish between indicators of political in-
stability, corruption and democracy. Political instability is likely to have an impact on foreign
investors for several reasons. First, the emergence of revolutionary movements (or civil wars) in
host countries has the capacity to destruct private property and increase uncertainty about the
security of property rights, a key consideration for rms holding non-liquid assets. Second, such
episodes may undermine the production of goods, transportation of products and sales in domestic
markets. Third, such incidents may disrupt the economic process and postpone important reforms.
While Asiedu (2002, 2005), Jaspersen et al. (2000), Schneider and Frey (1985), and Tuman
and Emmert (1999, 2004) capture political instability by direct measures of coups, revolutions,
strikes, etc., others have turned attention towards more general indices such as the Euromoney
political risk index, the International Credit Risk Guide (ICRG) political risk index or the Business
Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI) nationalisation risk index. As an alternative, Ancharaz
(2002) includes the standard deviation of government consumption as an indicator of political
instability. The argument stems from Brewer (1985) who argues that government agencies are
marked by a high degree of inertia and are unlikely to change except as a result of substantial
shocks. He therefore suggests that deviations of scal indicators (such as government spending)
from their trends can be used as a measure of government policy risk.
Even in the presence of a conductive macroeconomic environment, corruption can deter investors
from doing business. Corruption is a threat to investors for several reasons: it distorts the economic
and nancial environment thereby raising operating costs, it reduces the e¢ ciency of government
and business by slowing down the bureaucratic process and by enabling people to assume positions
for which they are not qualied, and it destabilises the political process. In addition, the degree of
corruption in host countries tends to be highly correlated with many other dimensions of government
quality, such as the extent of bureaucracy and red tape, or the quality of the legal system. While
most empirical papers have included some corruption index, Ancharaz (2002), Asiedu (2002) and
Onyeiwu (2003) have included government consumption as a share of GDP based on the argument
that it indicates economic distortions, government ine¢ ciency and corruption.
Democracy is another aspect of a sound political environment. Authoritative regimes are often
associated with a greater risk of policy reversals, due for example to the dictators own desire,
the need to raise public support through populist measures or simply coups. Democratic regimes
are also more likely to respect the rule of law and property rights.3 Many authors have therefore
included the Freedom House annual rating of political rights and civil liberties. Political rights
enable people to participate freely in the political process, compete for public o¢ ce, and elect
representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate.
Civil liberties indicate freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organisational rights,
rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state.
Commercial risk can be divided into measures of the quality of governance, rule of law in-
dicators and more specic variables reecting the investment climate. The quality of governance
includes broad measures of government e¤ectiveness, bureaucratic competence and quality of public
3See Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004) for further references on the impacts of democracy.
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service delivery. While Garibaldi et al. (2002) have included a whole range of governance measures
from the World Development Report (1997), Kinoshita and Campos (2003), Ancharaz (2002), and
Globerman and Shapiro (2002) have used econometric tools to construct their own quality indicator
based on various governance measures.
The rule of law is the most frequently used commercial risk measure. The strength and im-
partiality of the legal system and popular support for the law reect the degree to which citizens
are willing to accept the established institutions for making and implementing laws and adjudicat-
ing disputes. While Asiedu (2005), Kinoshita and Campos (2003), and Méon and Sekkat (2004)
have used overall indices of the impartiality of the legal system and the extent to which the rule
is enforced, Gastanaga et al. (1998) use a more specic measure of contract enforcement from the
BERI.
Indicators of the investment climate include an amalgamate of factors more directly relevant
to the foreign investor. Deichmann (2001), for example, uses the overall investment climate rating
from EBRD (1999), which ranks countries according to the following considerations: macroeconomy,
taxation, political stability, business regulations, the judiciary, law and order, and other obstacles.
Garibaldi et al. (2002) and Kinoshita and Campos (2003) include a measure of the restrictions on
FDI in order to capture other important aspects of transfer risk: approval requirements, the extent
to which prots can be remitted abroad, ease in liquidating assets, and preferential treatment of
direct investment. Zeghni (2001) constructs an intellectual property rights protection (IPR) index,
which captures the strength of IPR protection legislation and its enforcement. Finally, Globerman
and Shapiro (2002) apply the Kaufmann et al. (1999) regulatory burden index, which measures
government intervention, trade policy, capital restrictions, etc.
In addition to the individual risk measures summarised in the tables, several papers have in-
cluded some overall composite risk indices. First, the Euromoney risk rating has been applied by
Carstensen and Toubal (2003), Frenkel et al. (2004), Garibaldi et al. (2002) and Wezel (2003). The
index summarises di¤erent inuences on the overall risk of a country including economic perfor-
mance, political risk, debt indicators, access to bank lending, access to short-term nance, access to
capital markets, discount on forfeiting, credit ratings and debt in default or rescheduling. Second,
the Institutional Investor risk rating ranks countries on the probability of default. This index has
been used by Bevan and Estrin (2004), Janicki and Wunnava (2004), Schneider and Frey (1985),
Treviño et al. (2002a, b), and Treviño and Mixon (2004). Third, the composite ICRG index of
economic, nancial and political risk has been used by Jaspersen et al. (2000), Méon and Sekkat
(2004) and Wezel (2003). Finally, the index of economic freedom applied by Bengoa and Sanchez-
Robles (2003) quanties aspects such as the size of government, the legal structure and security of
property rights, access to sound money, freedom to trade internationally, and regulation of credit,
labour and business.
A few observations from the survey should be highlighted. The importance of economic risk as
a determinant of a countrys attractiveness as an investment location has rarely been questioned.
Most empirical papers on FDI include a measure of exchange rate risk, ination and economic
instability (typically based on some debt measure). Political risk factors are less frequently included
and commercial risk is only accounted for in a small number of papers. And when such political
and commercial risk measures are taken into account, there is little consensus on which measures to
include. Overall there seems to be a need for a more profound analysis of the relative importance
of the suggested risk proxies. Based on the derived measure of country risk in Section 3, Section 4
therefore contributes to this debate and uses a general-to-specic methodology to provide a set of
variables that are signicant and robust determinants of country risk.
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3 A Rened Measure of Risk
Although all of the risk measures summarised above can be justied theoretically each of them
only captures one dimension of risk. So far, the solution has been the rather ad hoc inclusion of
multiple risk measure or the construction of risk indices. Instead this paper o¤ers a rened measure
of country risk. This paper builds on the variance of GDP growth, which has often been used
as an overall risk measure, see among others Hausmann and Gavin (1995), Ramey and Ramey
(1995), Servén (1998) and Calderón et al. (2003). The focus on GDP growth is motivated by
the new growth literature, which argues that GDP growth per worker reects the most important
elements of economic policy and performance. Not only does it reect the market potential of an
economy (the strength of local demand), as highlighted by Guiso and Parigi (1998), but eventually
all ine¢ ciencies, instabilities and incredibilities of an economy will show up in the growth rate.4
This argument is conrmed by Calderón, Loayza and Servén (2003) who nd that when stock-
market returns are regressed on other underlying indicators (ination, exchange rate, political and
nancial risk), GDP growth takes the bulk of the explained variance.
Yet, it is quite obvious that variability only amounts to uncertainty when events are unpre-
dictable, and therefore a rened measure of uncertainty will be required.5 First, we derive a
conditional risk measure by taking out the part of GDP growth caused by growth determinants
that move only slowly and therefore can be partly predicted by an investor. Second, since countries
are interdependent there will be some systematic components in the local return to investment that
will depend on global and regional factors. Adjusting for such structural and systematic factors
will give us an improved measure of idiosyncratic country risk.
3.1 Adjustment for Economic Fundamentals
Proxying the return to investment with GDP growth, we can decompose actual return into a
predictable part, x0it, and an unpredictable part, "it,
 ln(yit) = x
0
it + "it, (1)
where yit is real GDP per worker in country i at time t, xit is a vector of economic fundamentals
identied from the neoclassical and endogenous growth literature, and "it is the growth residual.
6While the variance of growth has previously been used as a measure of risk, this paper has made
the case that 2"i is a better proxy for country risk.
The methodology behind the growth regression is based on the convergence literature, most
notably Islam (1995), where the growth regression in a panel data setting can be presented as
 ln(yit) = i + (  1) ln yit 1 + 0 ln(nit + g + ) + 1 ln(invit) + 2 ln(openit) + "it, (2)
4GDP growth is also by far the most frequently applied proxy for market potential in the papers referenced in
Table A1-A3 and is therefore tightly linked with the return to investment.
5This statement was stressed by Servén (1998) who draw the distinction between sample variation and uncertainty.
The argument is that the former may overstate the latter by including not only truly unpredictable innovations to
the variables of interest, but possibly also (cyclical) movements partly predictable from the past.
6We assume that growth and return are linearly and positively correlated. However, foreign investors might
experience increasing factor prices and scarce resources in countries where FDI inows have increased a lot over a
short period of time. This means that there will be some second order e¤ects that are not captured by the simple
linear relationship dened in this paper.
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where i is an unobserved country-specic time-invariant constant reecting among other things the
initial level of e¢ ciency, institutional settings, geographic characteristics and cultural norms, and
where the lagged dependent variable, ln yit 1, captures the tendency of an economy to converge to
its steady state. The term (nit+ g+ ) captures the e¤ectiveness of the production factors: nit the
is growth rate of the labour force, g is technological advancement and  is the rate of depreciation.
In line with Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) we assume (g+ ) to be the same for all countries and
equal to 0.05. Capital accumulation is the main driver of growth in the traditional Solow model and
we therefore include total investment as a share of GDP, invit. Finally, like Beaudry, Collard and
Green (2005) we include total trade as a share of GDP, openit, as an instrument for institutions.
Income per capita, investment, openness and population are from Penn World Tables 6.1. Due to
errors in the demographic time series, as documented by Dowrick (2005), data on the labour force
are taken from WDI (2005).7
Various methods have been used to estimate the growth regression. In the presence of unobserved
country-specic e¤ects and a lagged dependent variable, Hsiao (1986) shows that the pooled OLS
estimator (POLS) is upwards biased, and Nickell (1981) shows that the Fixed E¤ects (FE) estimator
is downwards biased. We therefore turn to the rst-di¤erences Generalised Method of Moments
(GMM-DIF) estimator, originally developed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) and Arellano
and Bond (1991), which produces consistent estimates in the dynamic growth relation. The basic
idea is to take rst-di¤erences to remove unobserved time-invariant country-specic e¤ects, and
then instrument the right-hand-side variables in the rst-di¤erenced equations using levels of the
series lagged two periods or more, under the assumption that the time-varying disturbances in the
original levels equation are not serially correlated.
However, when the time series are persistent ( close to unity) the GMM-DIF estimator is poorly
behaved. The reason is that, under such conditions, lagged levels of the variables are only weak
instruments for subsequent rst-di¤erences. We therefore turn to the system GMM (GMM-SYS)
estimator suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The GMM-SYS
estimator exploits an assumption about the initial conditions to obtain moment conditions that
remain informative even for persistent series.8 Results are reported in Table 2. All estimators are
based on the e¢ cient two-step estimator to allow for heteroscedasticity in the residuals. Since the
two-step GMM estimators have the disadvantage of converging to their asymptotic distribution
relatively slowly we compensate by using the nite-sample correction to the two-step covariance
matrix derived by Windmeijer (2005). Investment, openness and population growth rates are
treated as endogenous variables in the GMM estimators, which means that instruments should be
lagged two periods or more to be valid. All regressions are carried out using STATA.
The results are largely in line with other empirical studies; see for example Bond, Hoe­ er and
Temple (2001). Unexpectedly, open enters negatively in the regression, which is also the case in
the Beaudry, Collard and Green (2005) IV5 regression for the period 1978-98. This could be due
to omitted variable bias (from human capital or excluded short-term growth determinants) or due
to the fact that there might be some short term drawbacks from trade that disappear in the longer
run. It is worth noticing that the coe¢ cient on the lagged dependent variable is lower than in
other studies. This is because we use annual observations rather than the typical 5-year averages.
7Human capital enters as a fundamental growth determinant in the Solow model. However, since typical human
capital variables (average years of schooling or school enrolment rates) are available only with ve year intervals such
variables have been excluded. In addition, we do not include time dummies since these are not predictable by foreign
investors. Tests show, however, that rge results are robust to the inclusion of time dummies.
8Bond, Hoe­ er and Temple (2001) argue that the necessary stationarity restriction on the initial conditions are
consistent with standard growth frameworks and we refer to their paper for more details.
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In this case the persistency of the income data will be higher and, consequently, that the rate of
convergence will be lower. Given the high  we base our subsequent analysis on residuals from the
GMM-SYS estimator.
Table 2. Growth Determinants
POLS FE GMM-DIF GMM-SYS
constant 0.009 0.123** -0.061
[0.027] [0.049] [0.059]
ln(yt 1) -0.004** -0.053* -0.186*** -0.005
[0.002] [0.007] [0.040] [0.006]
ln(n+ g + d) -0.019** -0.037*** -0.045 -0.058***
[0.009] [0.012] [0.045] [0.022]
ln(inv) 0.015*** 0.011*** -0.055*** 0.023***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.021] [0.006]
ln(open) -0.011 0.004 0.041** -0.015***
[0.002] [0.006] [0.016] [0.005]
Note: Dependent variable is growth in GDP per capita. Growth regressions including 126 countries
using annual data , 1970-2000. Heteroscedastic consistent standard errors in brackets.
*** signicant at 1%, ** signicant at 5%, * signicant at 10%.
3.2 Adjusting for Global and Regional Interdependence
Figure 1 depicts a clear common trend in the regional returns, which we interpret as a global return
factor. This is conrmed by Albuquerque et al. (2002) and Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003),
among others, who argue that the close trading and investment relationships between countries
give rise to a global business cycle. This means that the global investment climate will a¤ect
the return to investment in individual countries and regions. In our context, the presence of a
global return component means that there is some component in the unpredictable return, "it, that
varies systematically across countries. To capture this, we dene a single-index model based on the
assumption that the common return component, !t, enters linearly in the country-specic return.9
Now, the unpredictable return component (the growth residual) can be written as
"^it = i!!t + eit, eit  IID(0; 2ei), (3)
where i! reects the degree to which global return factors spill over into local return (the degree
of global integration). i!!t can be interpreted as the part of local return that is attributable to
the global investment climate. Now, eit can be interpreted as the local return adjusted both for the
structural characteristics of the host economy and the systematic return due to global investment
conditions. ^2ei therefore gives a rened measure of country risk.
9For simplicity the degree of global and regional spillovers are assumed to be constant over time. This is not
completely in line with empirical observations since one of the most signicant features about the global economy of
the past few decades has been the move towards closer and more open trading systems and investment relationships
between countries. However, this assumption is necessary to make the index model operational.
9
Not only are returns in individual countries a¤ected by global factors but Figure 1 also suggests
that countries belonging to the same region are a¤ected by common shocks (regional contagion).10
The regional return component could be explained by the fact that many multinational rms locate
in one country but serve markets in the whole region. Also political, economic and social ties be-
tween countries within a region (often enhanced by the signing of Regional Integration Agreements)
means that shocks to one country spills over to the remaining countries in the region.
To capture the regional aspect of local return, we dene an indicator of regional belonging that
takes on the value one if country i belongs to region k and zero otherwise, Iik = 1(i 2 k). We
then dene a regional return component, kt, common to all countries in region k but varying over
time, that enters linearly in the local return of country i
e^it =
KX
k=1
ikIikkt + uit, uit  IID(0; 2ui), (4)
where ik is the spillover from the regional investment climate to the local, and kt is return
in region k at time t. Now, ^ik ^kt can be interpreted as the part of country return that is
attributable to the regional investment climate. Under such circumstances ^2ui is the relevant
measure of idiosyncratic country risk since it is adjusted for both the structural and systematic
components.
We make the return components operational by means of a principal components analysis (PCA).
The PCA will extract from the historical variance-covariance matrix of growth residuals a series of
uncorrelated linear combinations that contain most of the variance of the original data. The rst
principal component has maximal overall variance. The second principal component has maximal
variance among all unit length linear combinations that are uncorrelated with the rst principal
component, etc.
Empirically, !^t can therefore be estimated as the rst principal component of "^it, and ^i! is
the factor loading reecting the degree of global spillover. Since the PCA methodology requires
full time series for the growth residual, the 126 countries from the growth regression are reduced
to 92 developed and developing countries that enter the global PCA. It is worth noticing that the
sign of i! and !t are not identied individually. Based on the belief that the USA is a dominant
player in the global economy, we have therefore normalised the sign of i! and !t to ensure that
cov(!t; "USA;t) > 0.
By symmetry, ^kt can be obtained as the rst principal component from a region-by-region
PCA of e^it, and ^ik is the factor loading reecting the degree of regional spillover. Again, the
sign of ^kt and ^ik are not identied individually and we normalise the sign to ensure that the
largest economy in the region (in terms of GDP) is positively correlated with regional return,
cov( t; eDYNAMO;t) > 0. The argument is that the largest economy often functions as a regional
dynamo and we wish to ensure that there is a positive connection between the dynamo and the
regional business cycle. The dynamos are South Africa (Africa), Brazil (Latin America) and China
(Asia).
10The existence of a regional market seeking motive of foreign investors has been conrmed by Veugelers (1991),
Chakrabarti (1997, 2003), Méon and Sekkat (2002), Sethi et al. (2003), Jaumotte (2004), and Carstensen and Toubal
(2004), and the importance of the macroeconomic and political situation of neighbouring countries has been examined
by Ades and Chua (1997), and Easterly and Levine (2000). In addition, in their cluster analysis of the relationship
between nancial market segmentation and political risk, Hooper and Heaney (2001) nd that stock markets are
generally segmented on a regional basis.
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Figure 2. Global and Regional Principal Components
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Note: The gure shows the development in !^t and ^kt over time. The principal components have
been normalised to ensure that the global component is positively correlated with US return and that
the regional component is positively correlated with the dominant country in the particular region.
Figure 2 depicts the time pattern of the global and regional principal components, !^t and ^kt.
Overall, the global component explains 14% of the total variance. The Asian principal component
is the strongest explaining 21% of the residual variance, whereas the Latin American and African
components explain 17% and 11%, respectively. The global return component is quite volatile and
tests reject that it is constant over time. The global return picks up the economic downturns in
conjunction with the two oil crisis in 1973 and 1979. It also shows a more stabilised economy during
the 1980s as well as the upturn in the mid 1990s.
Tests also reject the hypothesis that the regional return components are constant over time.
During the rst two decades, the African return component was quite volatile but the region has
stabilised during the late 1980s and 1990s at a relatively high level compared with Asia and Latin
America. This is in line with the prediction from Figure 1. The Asian return component, on the
other hand, has been stable and most often positive except for the Asian crisis that comes through
strongly in the return component in the late 1990s. Finally, the Latin American debt crisis in the
1980s shows up clearly in the regional return.
The PCA methodology ensures that the covariance between the two indices is zero (E[!tkt] =
0), and that the residual is uncorrelated with each index (E([!tuit] = E([ktuit] = 0). Together
this means that conditional risk can be decomposed as
2"i = 
2
i!
2
! + 
2
ik
2k + 
2
ui, (5)
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where 2i!
2
! is the global risk factor, 
2
ik
2k is the regional risk factor and 
2
ui is the idiosyncratic
country risk factor. Table 3 shows the risk decomposition for the sample of 67 developing countries
for which coherent data was available.
Table 3. Risk Decomposition
Africa 2"i 
2
i!
2
!=
2
"i 
2
ik
2k=
2
"i 
2
ui=
2
"i
Algeria 0.309 0.013 0.149 0.838
Benin 0.165 0.053 0.069 0.878
Burkina Faso 0.124 0.143 0.462 0.395
Burundi 0.954 0.006 0.010 0.984
Cameroon 0.378 0.113 0.001 0.887
Cape Verde 0.589 0.001 0.248 0.751
Congo, Rep. 0.457 0.034 0.022 0.944
Cote dIvoire 0.202 0.005 0.310 0.685
Egypt 0.170 0.068 0.004 0.929
Ethiopia 0.351 0.044 0.032 0.924
Gabon 0.987 0.091 0.012 0.897
Gambia 0.185 0.002 0.130 0.867
Ghana 0.392 0.161 0.072 0.767
Guinea-Bissau 0.142 0.013 0.094 0.893
Iran 0.741 0.086 0.272 0.642
Jordan 0.618 0.001 0.036 0.964
Kenya 0.335 0.023 0.004 0.973
Lesotho 0.516 0.141 0.023 0.835
Madagascar 0.074 0.074 0.065 0.861
Malawi 0.698 0.021 0.001 0.978
Mali 0.336 0.080 0.046 0.875
Mauritius 0.165 0.022 0.574 0.405
Morocco 0.225 0.001 0.153 0.845
Mozambique 0.682 0.092 0.009 0.900
Niger 0.503 0.032 0.256 0.712
Nigeria 0.937 0.147 0.027 0.826
Senegal 0.254 0.011 0.547 0.442
South Africa 0.024 0.121 0.098 0.782
Syria 1.170 0.037 0.026 0.937
Tanzania 0.915 0.001 0.023 0.977
Togo 0.794 0.030 0.000 0.970
Tunisia 0.078 0.041 0.010 0.949
Uganda 0.723 0.174 0.030 0.796
Zambia 0.160 0.070 0.050 0.880
Zimbabwe 0.379 0.000 0.043 0.957
Average 0.450 0.056 0.112 0.833
Note: Decomposes conditional risk into the global, regional and idiosyncratic components.
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Table 3. Decomposition of Country Risk (continued)
Latin America 2"i 
2
i!
2
!=
2
"i 
2
ik
2k=
2
"i 
2
ui=
2
"i
Argentina 0.374 0.001 0.251 0.748
Bolivia 0.075 0.165 0.210 0.625
Brazil 0.156 0.339 0.205 0.457
Chile 0.366 0.187 0.010 0.803
Colombia 0.038 0.310 0.279 0.411
Costa Rica 0.124 0.303 0.016 0.681
Dominican Republic 0.121 0.195 0.032 0.773
Ecuador 0.247 0.095 0.314 0.591
El Salvador 0.171 0.167 0.015 0.818
Guatemala 0.054 0.277 0.265 0.458
Honduras 0.185 0.003 0.013 0.985
Jamaica 0.246 0.084 0.118 0.798
Mexico 0.099 0.052 0.176 0.773
Panama 0.200 0.053 0.209 0.738
Paraguay 0.140 0.006 0.115 0.879
Peru 0.379 0.003 0.335 0.662
Trinidad and Tobago 0.652 0.002 0.002 0.997
Uruguay 0.260 0.031 0.320 0.649
Venezuela 0.136 0.007 0.004 0.989
Average 0.212 0.120 0.152 0.728
Asia 2"i 
2
i!
2
!=
2
"i 
2
ik
2k=
2
"i 
2
ui=
2
"i
Bangladesh 0.200 0.102 0.048 0.849
China 0.179 0.045 0.047 0.908
India 0.099 0.098 0.001 0.901
Indonesia 0.137 0.004 0.598 0.398
Malaysia 0.078 0.186 0.283 0.531
Nepal 0.098 0.031 0.068 0.902
Pakistan 0.056 0.004 0.232 0.764
Philippines 0.103 0.200 0.200 0.599
Sri Lanka 0.062 0.110 0.174 0.716
Thailand 0.154 0.021 0.662 0.317
Turkey 0.129 0.008 0.058 0.934
Average 0.118 0.074 0.216 0.711
Note: Decomposes conditional risk into the global, regional and idiosyncratic components.
On average, the conditional risk of investing in Africa (0.005) is signicantly higher than in-
vesting in Latin America (0.002) or in Asia (0.001). The Latin American countries are the most
a¤ected by global conditions: in Latin America the global risk factor explains 12% of the total
variance as opposed to 7% in Asia and 6% in Africa. On a regional basis, the Asian spillover e¤ect
is the strongest, and the Asian return factor explains close to 22% of the total variance. In Latin
America and Africa the regional factor accounts for 15% and 11%, respectively. Overall, this means
that idiosyncratic country risk accounts for 84% of total risk in Africa, but only 73% and 71% in
Latin America and Asia, respectively. Since idiosyncratic risk is the relevant measure of country
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risk, the low level of investment in African countries might be explained not only by a large total
risk but more importantly by a large proportion of conditional risk being idiosyncratic risk.
Asian and Latin American countries, on the other hand, are more integrated in the global
economy and a large part of the risk of investing in these countries is systematic risk that can be
compensated by a risk premium. The enormous ows of FDI to Asian countries indicate that the
local return has been high enough to compensate for the large systematic risk components.
4 What Determines Country Risk?
Having now adjusted for the structural component of country risk due to economic fundamentals as
well as the systematic global and regional risk components, we are left with a measure of idiosyn-
cratic country risk that enables us to carry out an analysis of which factors inuence idiosyncratic
risk. This section therefore applies econometric tools to select among the various risk measures
summarised in Table A1-A3 the most signicant determinants of country risk. That is, we estimate
^2ui = x
0
i + i, (6)
where xi is a vector of economic, political and commercial risk measures. We include in our list of
explanatory variables as many as possible of the risk measures suggested in the empirical literature
on FDI and risk. However, since some of these papers focus on bilateral FDI ows, include only
a selection of countries (for example transition economies) or calculate their own risk measures
using econometric tools (such as GARCH or factor analysis) we will not be able to collect all the
variables listed in the tables. Where nothing else is mentioned, the variables have been calculated
as averages over the time period 1970-2000. Table A4 provides summary statistics and sources of
the 35 potential risk measures. Data availability means that we end up with a cross-section of 60
developing countries.
4.1 Description of Variables
To capture exchange rate risk we add two measures based on the real exchange rate. First, given
the non-stationarity of the real exchange rate we take the variance of the log-di¤erence rather
than the level (vrexch). Second, we include the average log-di¤erence of the real exchange rate
(crexch). As another group of economic risk variables, we take in both ination (infl) and the
variance of ination (vinfl) over the period 1970-2000. Third, we include four indicators of the debt
situation of the host economy: external debt as a share of GDP (exdebt), the debt-service ratio
(debtserv), long-term debt as a share of GDP (longdebt), and international reserves as a share
of GDP (intres). Finally, we add the current account balance as a share of GDP (caccount)
and the government decit as a share of GDP (deficit) to account for the scal balance.
We include a large variety of political risk variables. We capture political instability by the Kauf-
mann et al. (2005) index of political instability and violence (stability), measuring the likelihood
of violent threats to the government, as well as the standard deviation of the share of government
consumption in GDP (govcon). In addition, we include some of the ICRG subcomponents: the
governments ability to carry out its declared programs and its ability to stay in o¢ ce (govstab),
internal political violence and civil disorder (internal), external conicts (external), military
participation in government (military), religious tensions (religion) and ethnic tensions due to
racial, nationality or language divisions (ethnic). Three measures of corruption have been added.
14
First, is the Kaufmann corruption index (corruption), which measures the exercise of public
power for private gain. Second, we add the ICRG assessment of corruption within the political
system (polcor), which is more concerned with corruption in the form of excessive patronage,
nepotism, job reservations, favour-for-favour, secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties be-
tween politics and business. Finally, we take government consumption as a share of GDP (gcon).
To capture the e¤ects of democracy on risk, the voice and accountability variable (voice) from
Kaufmann (2005) reecting political, civil and human rights has been collected. In addition, the
indicators from the Freedom House index have been included individually: civil liberties (civil),
political rights (polrights) and democracy (fhdemoc). To supplement, we include the ICRG
measure of democratic accountability (account) to capture the degree of tension within a country.
Finally, the Marshall and Jaggers (2002) institutionalised democracy index (pdemoc) and the
Vanhanen (2000) index of democratisation (vdemoc) have been added to our list of political risk
measures.
Finally, the quality of governance is rst of all captured by the Kaufmann et al. (2005) indicator
of government e¤ectiveness (effect), which measures the competence of the bureaucracy and the
quality of public service delivery. We supplement with the bureaucratic quality indicator from
the ICRG (bureau), which reects the extent to which the national bureaucracy enjoys autonomy
from political pressure, has the strength and expertise to govern in a stable manner, and has
an e¤ective mechanism for recruiting and training. The strength and impartiality of the legal
system and popular observance of the law are captured by the Kaufmann et al. (2005) rule of
law indicator (law), measuring the quality of contract enforcement, the police and the courts,
as well as the likelihood of crime and violence, and the ICRG law and order indicator (order)
reecting the degree to which citizens are willing to accept the established institutions for making
and implementing laws as adjudicating disputes.
A more concrete measure of the investment climate is the Kaufmann (2005) regulatory quality
indicator (quality) measuring the incidence of market-unfriendly policies. Also, we supplement
with two ICRG subcomponents. First is the measure of socioeconomic conditions (socio), which
assesses the socioeconomic pressures at work in the society (unemployment, consumer condence
and poverty) that could constrain government action or fuel social dissatisfaction. Second, we
include the investment prole component (profile), which is an assessment of factors a¤ecting
contract viability/expropriation, prots repatriation and payment delays. Finally, we add the
Heritage Foundation property rights index (prights).
4.2 Methodology and Results
In view of the large set of (possibly correlated) potential determinants of country risk, it is a
challenge to maintain a reasonable degree of parsimony while avoiding misspecication of the model.
To deal with this, we use a general-to-specic model selection approach, which enables us to test
downamong the large set of potential right-hand-side variables. We use the PcGets software, which
automatically selects an undominated, congruent model where statistically insignicant variables
are eliminated and where diagnostic tests check the validity of reductions to ensure a congruent nal
selection. There are many ways in which a model can be simplied, so PcGets selects a multipath
search strategy, exploring the consequences of every initially-feasible path. We refer to Hendry
(1995, Chapter 9) for further details on the methodology.
Initially, we test the economic, political and commercial risk models separately and the results
are reported in Table 4 underneath. Column 1 shows that the external debt (exdebt), the debt
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service ratio (debtserv), international reserves (intres) and the current account (caccount) turn
out to be robust and signicant economic determinants of idiosyncratic country risk. As expected
highly indebted countries with poor debt services are perceived more risky since future tax liabilities
are anticipated to be higher. Likewise, a positive current account balance is indicative of a stable
economic environment and thus of lower risk. Surprisingly, the availability of international reserves
increases risk rather than lowering it. Since this result does not carry over into the combined model
in Column 4, we interpret the positive sign as being indicative of an omitted variable bias.
In Column 2 gcon, civil, vdemoc and account are the only robust determinants out of
the 18 proposed political risk measures. Government consumption as a share of GDP (gcon) was
included as an indicator of economic distortions, government ine¢ ciency and corruption, and its
positive correlation with risk is therefore to be expected. The civil liberty variable (civil) captures
freedom of expression, assembly, association, education and religion. It ranges from one to seven
where small numbers indicate an established and generally equitable system of rule of law, and
the positive sign of this risk proxy conrms the perception that countries with civil liberties are
less risky. The Vanhanen (2000) index of democratisation (vdemoc) and the ICRG measure of
democratic accountability (account) both capture the stabilising e¤ect of democracy. They are
rated so that high values indicate a more democratic regime and we would therefore expect them
to enter negatively in the regression. The fact that vdemoc has a positive sign suggests that as
soon as we take the accountability aspect of democracy into account, vdemoc actually captures
something that is positively correlated with risk. However, as we will see from Column 4, the
signicance of this variable is not robust to the merger of the three models and we will therefore
not go into details with this preliminary and unstable result.
From Column 3 we see that two out of the eight commercial risk variables turn out to be
signicant. Regulatory quality, high values of quality, lowers risk since it indicates the incidence
of market-friendly policies. Likewise, a high value of profile indicates good contract enforcement
and low risk of expropriation, prots repatriation and payment delays. The explanatory power
of the commercial risk variables is rather low and overall we must conclude that the proposed
commercial risk measures are not very successful in describing idiosyncratic risk. This can also be
seen from Column 4 where none of the commercial risk proxies enter in the combined model. There
seems to be scope for a more detailed analysis of the investment environment in order to detect
more precise indicators of commercial risk in developing countries.
Column 4 shows that when we merge the three models debtserv, account, gcon and ac-
count stay signicant while the remaining variables from Column 1-3 are not robust to the inclu-
sion of other risk variables. On the other hand, the prevalence of external conicts (external)
becomes a signicant determinant of idiosyncratic country risk. Interestingly, when we carry out
the general-to-specic exercise using overall risk, the variance of GDP growth, ^2 ln(yit);i, as the
dependent variable
^2 ln(yit);i = x
0
i + i, (7)
only the debt service ratio, the current account balance and government consumption turn out
signicant and robust. This is in line with Persson and Tabellini (2006) who nd that democracy
has no direct e¤ect on growth but there is a positive indirect e¤ect via higher expected returns.
However, once we adjust for structural and systematic components we are able to pick up an e¤ect
of democratic accountability on country risk.
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Overall, the ve signicant risk measures account for close to 60 per cent of idiosyncratic risk.
Since there are obviously missing variables and serious endogeneity issues, we need to turn to
instrumental variable estimation methods, see for example Persson and Tabellini (2006), in order to
determine the direction of causality. This lies beyond the scope of this paper. Overall, we conclude
that several of the suggested individual risk measures correlate signicantly with idiosyncratic risk
but that one needs to be careful in selecting individual measures. Our results also indicate that
studies that focus solely on one type of risk (typically economic risk) leave out important explanatory
variables resulting in biased and inconsistent results.
Table 4. Determinants of Idiosyncratic Risk
Economic Political Commercial Combined Combined
Risk measure ^2ui ^
2
ui ^
2
ui ^
2
ui ^
2
 ln(yit);i
exdebt 0.388**
[0.153]
debtserv -0.033*** -0.041* -0.038***
[0.012] [0.013] [0.014]
intres 1.233**
[0.560]
caccount -0.024** -0.033*** -0.042***
[0.012] [0.001] [0.007]
gcon 0.034*** 0.027*** 0.035***
[0.012] [0.001] [0.007]
civil 0.101**
[0.044]
vdemoc 0.037***
[0.019]
account -0.339*** -0.149***
[0.154] [0.041]
external 0.053***
[0.017]
quality -0.267***
[0.075]
profile -0.047***
[0.007]
R2 0.45 0.43 0.14 0.59 0.44
Note: Results from a general-to-specic analysis of 35 risk measures on idiosyncratic risk. The sample includes
60 developing countries. A constant was included but is not reported. Heteroscedastic consistent standard errors
in brackets.*** signicant at 1%, ** signicant at 5%, * signicant at 10%. The PcGets software package was used.
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5 Summary and Conclusions
Although the inow of FDI to developing countries has increased tremendously during the last
decade, the regional distribution of such inows has been heavily biased against the poor African
countries. Empirical observations presented in this paper suggest that the uneven distribution of
FDI cannot be explained by a low return to investment in these countries, and recent studies of FDI
have increasingly turned attention towards country risk as an explanation for the poor investment
records of African countries. Ideally, the appropriate risk measure would be the volatility of returns
to investment, but since suitable measures of rates of return to FDI are rarely available, empirical
papers linking FDI to risk have applied various proxies for country risk. While one group of studies
includes various economic, political and commercial risk measures, another set of papers apply
various volatility measures to proxy for the risk of the foreign investment.
This paper provides a bridge between these two empirical methodologies. Taking the variance
of GDP growth as the overall proxy for country risk, we argue that volatility should only be
interpreted as risk when events are unpredictable, and the applied volatility measure therefore
does not reect idiosyncratic country risk. This paper suggests two renements that take out
the structural and systematic components of total risk thereby o¤ering an improved measure of
idiosyncratic country risk. This exercise allows us to decompose conditional risk (total risk adjusted
for economic fundamentals) into its global, regional and idiosyncratic risk components. Results
suggest that the low level of investment in African countries might be explained not only by a large
conditional risk but more importantly by a large proportion of this risk being idiosyncratic risk.
As a nal exercise, we survey the empirical literature on FDI and risk in order to collect as many
economic, political and commercial risk proxies as possible. We then utilise an econometric general-
to-specic methodology to select robust indicators that describe the rened idiosyncratic country
risk measure. We conclude that both economic and political risk variables are important determi-
nants of idiosyncratic However, the proposed commercial risk measures are not very successful in
describing idiosyncratic risk and more work could be done in this area.
Overall, our results indicate that both empirical methodologies are valid in that our rened
country risk measure correlate well with several of the risk proxies proposed in the literature.
However, if the applied risk measure builds on GDP growth volatility, it is important to adjust for
structural and systematic risk components in order to capture idiosyncratic country risk. Likewise,
if one chooses to include various risk measures particular attention should be directed towards the
host countrys ability to service its debt, to ensure a positive current account balance, to keep
government consumption on a sustainable level, to implement democratic accountability and to
avoid external conicts.
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Definition Source
Exchange rate
Lemi and Asefa (2003) Variance of real exchange rate World Development Indicators
(WDI) (World Bank)
Ancharaz (2002) Change in real exchange rate World Economic Outlook (WEO)
(IMF)
Deichmann (2001), Kamaly (2002) Change in nominal exchange rate WDI (World Bank)
Wezel (2003) Two-year moving average of squared
percentage change in the bilateral real
exchange rate
International Financial Statistics
(IFS) (IMF)
Treviño et al. (2002a, b), Treviño and
Mixon (2004), Tuman and Emmert
(1999, 2004), Wezel (2003)
Bilateral real exchange rate IFS (IMF)
Frenkel et al. (2004) Fixed exchange rate dummy. The regimes
are categorised in three groups: float,
intermediate and fixed
Levy-Yeati and Sturzenegger
(2002)
Garibaldi et al. (2002) Preannounced exchange rate regime
dummy
Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Restrictions
(IMF)
Garibaldi et al. (2002) Multiple exchange rates Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Restrictions
(IMF)
Asiedu (2002, 2005), Bengoa et al.
(2003), Frenkel et al. (2004), Garibaldi
et al. (2002), Holland and Pain (1998),
Kinoshita and Campos (2003), Onyeiwu
(2003), Onyeiwu et al. (2004), Schneider
and Frey (1985), Treviño et al.
(2002a,b), Treviño and Mixon (2004),
Tuman and Emmert (1999, 2004)
Inflation WDI (World Bank)
Lemi and Asefa (2003) Variance of inflation WDI (World Bank)
Schoeman et al. (2000) Government deficit as a share of GDP IFS (IMF)
Chen (1998) Balance of payments deficit as a share of
total expenditure
IFS (IMF)
Garibaldi et al. (2002), Schneider and
Frey (1985), Treviño et al. (2002a, b)
Current account balance as a share of
GDP
WEO (IMF)
Baumgarten and Hausman (2000),
Bengoa et al. (2003), Holland and Pain
(1998), Kamaly (2002), Lemi and Asefa
(2003), Onyeiwu (2003), Onyeiwu et al.
(2004), Wezel (2003)
External debt as a share of GDP WDI (World Bank)
Ancharaz (2002) Debt-service ratio WDI (World Bank)
Kamaly (2002) Long-term debt as a share of GDP WEO (IMF)
Kamaly (2002) Difference between total debt and
international reserves
WEO (IMF)
Onyeiwu et al. (2004) International reserves as a share GDP WDI (World Bank)
Inflation
Economic instability
Table A1. Economic Risk Factors
19
Table A2. Political Risk Factors
Definition Source
Political instability
Asiedu (2005), Jaspersen et al.
(2000)
Coups and revolutions. The number of forced
changes in the top government
Cross-National Time Series
Data Archive
Asiedu (2002, 2005) Assassinations. Politically motivated murder or
attempted murder of a high government official
Cross-National Time Series
Data Archive
Asiedu (2002, 2005) Revolutions. Illegal or forced change in the
ruling government
Cross-National Time Series
Data Archive
Tuman and Emmert (1999, 2004) Revolution deaths. Annual civilian and
combatant deaths caused by revolutionary
movements
Clodfelter (1992)
Schneider and Frey (1985), Tuman
and Emmert (1999, 2004)
Number of annual anti-government strikes and
riots
News database
Tuman and Emmert (1999, 2004) Annual number of successful or attempted
coups d'etat
News database
Baumgarten and Hausman (2000),
Meón and Sekkat (2004)
Political instability index. Ranges from 1 and 4
where 4 indicate more instability
ICRG political risk index. See
Coplin and O'Leary (1994)
Gastanaga et al. (1998) Nationalisation Risk Index. Ranges from 0 to 4
where 0 is most risky
Business Environmental Risk
Intelligence (BERI)
Ancharaz (2002) Standard deviation of government consumption
as a share of GDP
WDI (World Bank)
Corruption
Asiedu (2005) Actual or potential corruption within the political
system. Ranges from 0 to 6 where 6 indicates
more corruption
ICRG corruption index. See
Coplin and O'Leary (1994)
Jaspersen et al. (2000), Wei (2000) Control of corruption. Ranges from -2.5 to 2.5
where 2.5 indicates less illegal payments
Knack and Keefer (1995)
Meón and Sekkat (2004), Wei
(2000)
Corruption perception index defined as an
average of ten survey results on corruption over
a number of years. Ranges 0 to 9 where 9 is the
least corrupt
Transparency International
Wei (2000) The BI corruption index measures the degree to
which business transactions involve corruption
or questionable payments. Ranges from 1 to 10
where 10 is the least corrupt
Business International (now a
subsidiary of the Economist
Intelligence Unit
Gastanaga et al. (1998) Index of absence of corruption. Ranges from 0
to 10 where 10 is the least corrupt
Mauro (1995)
Meón and Sekkat (2004) Index of corruption Wei (2000)
Meón and Sekkat (2004) Index of corruption Kaufmann et al. (1999)
Ancharaz (2002), Asiedu (2002),
Onyeiwu (2003)
Government consumption as a share of GDP WDI (World Bank)
Democracy
Ferris et al. (1997), Kamaly (2002),
Lemi and Asefa (2003), Onyeiwu et
al. (2004), Tuman and Emmert
(2004)
Annual rating of political rights and civil liberties.
Ranges from 1 to 7 where 1 indicates the
highest degree of freedom
Freedom House
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Table A3. Commercial Risk Factors
Definition Source
Quality of governance
Kinoshita and Campos (2003) Bureaucratic quality. Constructed from two
indicators: (i) bureaucratic quality from ICRG, and
(ii) factor # 9, regulation from Holmes et al.
(1997). High values imply lower cost for foreign
investors
Campos (2000)
Ancharaz (2002) Institutional quality. Defined as the product of
ICRG's rule of law and corruption in government
indices
ICRG. See Coplin and O'Leary
(1994)
Garibaldi et al. (2002) Predictability of laws and policies. Ranges from 1
to 6 where 6 is worst
World Development Report (1997)
Garibaldi et al. (2002) Political stability and security of property. Ranges
from 1 to 6 where 6 is worst
World Development Report (1997)
Garibaldi et al. (2002) Overall government-business interface. Ranges
from 1 to 6 where 6 is worst
World Development Report (1997)
Garibaldi et al. (2002) Bureaucratic red tape. Ranges from 1 to 6 where
6 is worst
World Development Report (1997)
Garibaldi et al. (2002) Efficiency in government in providing services.
Ranges from 1 to 6 where 6 is worst
World Development Report (1997)
Méon and Sekkat (2004) Government effectiveness index. Ranges from -
2.5 to 2.5 where 2.5 implies higher effectiveness
Kaufmann et al. (1999)
Gastanaga et al. (1998) Bureaucratic Delay Index. Ranges from 0 to 4
where 4 implies low delay
BERI
Globerman and Shapiro (2002) Governance Infrastructure Index. First principal
component of governance indices (LAW,
INSTAB, REG, GOV, GRAFT, VOICE)
Kaufman et al. (1999)
Rule of law
Asiedu (2005), Kinoshita and
Campos (2003)
The impartiality of the legal system and the extent
to which the rule of law is enforced. Ranges from
0 to 6 where 6 implies a more impartial court
system
ICRG law and order index. See
Coplin and O'Leary (1994)
Méon and Sekkat (2004) Rule of law index. Ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 where
2.5 corresponds to agents having confidence in
and abide by the rules of society
Kaufmann et al. (1999)
Gastanaga et al. (1998) Contract Enforcement Index. Ranges from 0 to 4
where 4 implies better contract enforcement
BERI
Investment climate
Deichmann (2001) Investment climate rating from survey data.
Ranges from 1 to 4 where 4 indicates the worst
investment climate
EBRD (1999)
Garibaldi et al. (2002),  Kinoshita
and Campos (2003)
Restrictions on FDI. Ranges from -0.2 to 6 where
6 reflects most restrictions
Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Restrictions
(IMF)
Zeghni (2001) Intellectual Property Rights protection index.
Ranges from 1 to 3 where 3 implies stronger IPR
protection
Constructed by the author based
on information from Special 301
Recommendations
Globerman and Shapiro (2002) Regulatory Burden Index. Ranges from -2.5 to 2.5
where 2.5 implies less burdens
Kaufmann et al. (1999)
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Table A4. Summary Statistics of Risk Determinants
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source
Economic Risk Factors
crexch 67 0.14 0.17 0.00 0.92 IFS (IMF)
vrexch 67 0.31 1.66 0.00 13.53 IFS (IMF)
infl 66 0.44 1.06 -0.02 5.82 WDI (World Bank)
vinfl 66 11.74 60.72 0.00 444.87 WDI (World Bank)
exdebt 67 0.61 0.38 0.08 1.99 WDI (World Bank)
debtserv 67 5.40 2.82 1.05 15.49 WDI (World Bank)
longdebt 67 0.51 0.33 0.05 1.84 WDI (World Bank)
intres 67 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.31 WDI (World Bank)
caccount 67 -4.41 4.68 -31.06 2.23 WDI (World Bank)
Political Risk Factors
stability 66 -0.30 0.72 -2.38 1.20 Kaufmann et al. (2005)
govcon 67 0.13 0.06 0.04 0.35 WDI (World Bank)
govstab 61 6.66 0.74 4.87 8.38 ICRG subcomponent
internal 61 7.59 1.67 1.97 10.52 ICRG subcomponent
external 61 9.23 1.39 5.88 12.00 ICRG subcomponent
military 61 2.96 1.29 0.72 6.00 ICRG subcomponent
religion 61 4.30 1.23 1.16 6.00 ICRG subcomponent
ethnic 61 3.67 1.15 1.04 6.00 ICRG subcomponent
corruption 67 -0.36 0.48 -1.09 1.34 Kaufmann et al. (2005)
gcon 67 13.22 3.77 4.85 26.51 WDI (World Bank)
polcor 61 2.83 0.74 1.08 5.00 ICRG subcomponent
voice 67 -0.25 0.67 -1.53 1.31 Kaufmann et al. (2005)
civil 67 4.42 1.14 1.29 6.86 Freedom House
polrights 67 4.41 1.43 1.00 6.75 Freedom House
fhdemoc 66 4.47 2.31 0.60 9.88 Freedom House
pdemoc 66 0.68 4.90 -12.90 10.00 Heritage Foundation
vdemoc 67 6.93 5.98 0.00 24.67 Vanhanen (2000)
account 61 3.15 0.87 1.03 5.00 ICRG subcomponent
Commercial Risk Factors
effect 67 -0.26 0.53 -1.22 1.32 Kaufmann et al. (2005)
bureau 61 1.67 0.78 0.00 3.51 ICRG subcomponent
law 67 -0.30 0.54 -1.37 1.28 Kaufmann et al. (2005)
order 61 2.91 0.77 1.00 4.40 ICRG subcomponent
prights 67 3.07 0.77 1.00 5.00 Heritage Foundation
quality 67 0.03 0.57 -1.49 1.37 Kaufmann et al. (2005)
socio 61 5.22 0.81 3.23 7.79 ICRG subcomponent
profile 61 6.35 0.77 4.40 7.86 ICRG subcomponent
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